In his 1625 Curs us physicus, the philosopher Jean-Rodolphe Le Fevre defended Aristotelian hylomorphism against rival definitions of the "inner principles of natural things." His brief historical survey of positions begins with the monism of Parmenides and Melissus which posited that "all was one immobile being." Le Fevre rightly states that their theory denied the reality of the various changes we perceive to occur in nature. This was the reason-so he continues-why subsequent schools of thought rejected the Eleatic theory. Instead, they postulated principles that would both allow for and explain natural change. Le Fevre suggests that their solutions came in the guise of various dualisms: the Pythagoreans spoke of the battle between good and evil, the atomists of full and void, and the Platonists of ideas and things, to name the more prominent among the fourteen pre-Aristotelian positions known to this author. But all of them are wrong: "The fifteenth [view] which is the only true one was Aristotle's who said that there were two principles internal to, and by themselves constitutive of, natural bodies, namely matter and form."' All other analyses could be shown to be impossible on logical grounds alone, and Le Fevre dismisses them with outrage and scorn.
In the "Preface" to his Essential Tension (1977), Thomas Kuhn uncompromising insistence on an analysis of natural bodies in terms of matter and form and Kuhn's difficulty at breaking into the Aristotelian paradigm may both seem to underline the monolithic nature of hylomorphism and its outlandish appearance from a twentieth-century point of view. They also appear to lend support to the common assumption that takes the natural philosophy of late scholasticism to have been so rigidly deductive in structure, so didactic in its goals, and so strongly dependent on metaphysics and logic as to render it incapable of adapting to new evidence and to new methods. According to such a view, the Aristotelians' was a world-view that could only survive en bloc or disappear altogether. This is indeed the conclusion reached by Mary Patricia Reif, who with a sympathetic eye has surveyed a large number of seventeenth-century textbooks in natural philosophy. Reif supported her thesis with quotations such as the one she had found in Johannes Combach's 1620 textbook of physics. This German philosopher expressed the hope that someday someone will finally arise, who will show us more perfect principles, and gather into one certain system what Paracelsus and other teachers of truth have handed down here and there in scattered fashion, and deliver to us the order and connection of true physics.3
